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CASE COMMENTS
1902) § 740. Nevertheless, adoption of the majority view may be
justified on the policy considerations noted. To do so suggests
many perplexing problems, however, for instance, if the claim for
injury to property be assigned and recovery had by the assignee
prior to suit for personal injury, will the judgment be res judicata?
B. H. W., II.
WITNESSES--POWER TO COMPEL EXPERT TESTIMONY.-A real
estate expert who had appraised property for a prior owner not a
party to the present action, upon being questioned regarding his
opinion as to the value of the property by the taxpayer in a tax cer-
tiorari proceeding, stated he did not wish to participate in the case
and refused to accept a fee, when called as an expert for plaintiff.
The trial court sustained the witness in his refusal to testify as to
any matter asked him in his professional and not in his lay capacity,
and certiorari was granted on this point. Held, that a witness may
not, against his will, be compelled to give his opinion as an expert.
Judgment affirmed. People ex rel. Kraushaar v. Thorpe, 296 N. Y.
224, 72 N. E. (2d) 165 (1947).
This holding aligns New York with Indiana, Buchanan v. Stae,
59 Ind. 1 (1877), New Jersey, Hull v. Plume, 131 N. J. L. 511, 37
A. (2d) 53 (1944). and Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Transit Co. v.
Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 Atl. 630 (1918) ; Moran V. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 15 U. S. L. Week 2563 (W. D. Pa. 1947)
in following the doctrine of Webb v. Page, 1 Car. & K. 23 (N. P.
1843), distinguishing between one who sees a fact and is called on in
a court of justice to testify as to it and one selected by a party to
give his opinion on a matter with which he is peculiarly conversant
from the nature of his employment. The reasoning on which this
so-called "liberal" view is based is clearly enunciated in Stanton v.
Rushmore, 112 N. J. L. 115, 1.17, 169 Atl. 721 (1934), stating that
"neither justice nor public policy forbids that the expert shall re-
tain such knowledge and skill free from disclosure other than by his
voluntary act. This is true whether disclosure be sought for com-
pensation for the exercise of his skill, or in the expression of his
professional judgment privately, or as a witness in a court of jus-
tice." The decisions involve and the proposition is asserted only as
to one called as an expert witness in behalf of a private litigant. A
state or the United States may compel a citizen to testify as an expert
in criminal trials or other causes involving the public interest. See
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Pennsylvania Transit Co. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 441. The instant
case is exceptional in that the immunity claimed was absolute and
not contingent upon payment of a fee. Characteristically the cases
have involved witnesses who were asserting that they were entitled
to expert fees as a condition to testifying.
In that setting, the refusal to compel testimony has been sup-
ported by the argument that it is purely a matter of bargain beween
the litigant and the expert whether the expert shall testify, with the
amount of the compensation fixed by the bargain and the expert
liable for any breach of contract. This reasoning is generally re-
jected. A leading case for the contrary majority view, Dodge v.
Stiles, 26 Conn. 463, 466 (1857), disallows the argument on the
ground that "witnesses ... would be tempted to barter their oaths
at the expense of truth and justice." Wigmore lists numerous
other considerations in support of the majority rule, 8 WIGMORE,
EVDENCF (3d ed. 1940) § 2203. By far the greater number of
jurisdictions take the view that an expert may be compelled to
testify to facts within the field of his special competence, without
extra compensation although it may have required professional
study, skill, or learning to equip himself, See (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1576;
WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2203; ROGES, ExrimT TuESTIMONY (3d ed.
1941) 537, limiting the rule, however, to opinions which he can give
without detailed preparation for the individual case which if involv-
ed, will entitle him to extra compensation. (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1576;
(1935) 70 C. J. 41; WIGMORE, EViENCE § 2203. West Virginia ac-
cepts the majority view. The Supreme Court of Appeals has cited
with approval Dodge v. Stiles, supra, and stated that "an expert wit-
ness may be compelled to testify as to matters of a professional opin-
ion. or to matters to which he has gained special kmowledge by reason
of his special training and experience; but... an expert performing
services to qualify himself at the request of a party to an action, is
entitled to compensation above the ordinary witness fees for the
reasonable value of the time and labor spent in preparation." Ealy
v. Shetler Ice Cream Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S. E. 539 (1929). Cf.
Alexander v. Watson, 128 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942). As a
practical matter it would seem that a litigant compelling an expert
to testify in his behalf would definitely not be assured of a friendly
attitude on the part of the witness nor a favorable response to ques-
tioning, and that it would seem safer not to rely on a power of com-
pulsion but to contract privately beforehand with a capable expert
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who is willing to testify and who knows the nature of the testimony
he will be required to give. Many experts, including the very best
qualified, would indeed be motivated by personal and professional
ethics to give the same quality of testimony without regard to fi-
nancial benefits received; but this means only that the litigant with
a weak case would buy the always available services of the other
type of technically qualified witness whom he would. ordinarily not
dare to summon. whereas those of the highest probity would find
their services used compulsorily and without compensation where
no dilution of truth was required.
J. W. S., JR.
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